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   We	  study	  how	  the	  formality	  of	  a	  bargaining	  procedure	  affects	  its	  outcome.	  We	   compare	   a	   formal	   Baron-­‐Ferejohn	   bargaining	   procedure	   to	   an	   informal	  procedure	  where	  players	  make	  and	  accept	  proposals	  in	  continuous	  time.	  Both	  constitute	   non-­‐cooperative	   games	   corresponding	   to	   the	   same	   bargaining	  problem:	  a	  three-­‐player	  median	  voter	  setting	  with	  an	  external	  disagreement	  point.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  study	  formality	  in	  the	  presence	  and	  absence	  of	  a	  core	  and	  provides	  a	  natural	  explanation	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  preference	  polarization.	  Our	  results	  show	  that	  polarization	  hurts	  the	  median	  player	  and	  that	  formality	  matters.	  The	  median	  player	  is	  significantly	  better	  off	  under	  informal	  bargain-­‐ing.	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1. Introduction	  	  
The	  outcome	  of	  a	  legislative	  bargaining	  process	  is	  usually	  a	  result	  of	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	  bargaining.	  When	  parliament	  is	  in	  session,	  parliamentary	  procedures	  strictly	   govern	   what	   members	   can	   do	   at	   what	   time;	   hence,	   bargaining	   is	   highly	  formalized.	  After	  official	  sessions	  have	  been	  adjourned,	  however,	  bargaining	  often	  continues	   informally	   in	   offices,	   corridors	   and	   backrooms,	   where	   formal	   rules	  barely	   exist.	   That	   bargaining	   occurs	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   formality	   likely	   has	  historical	  and	  functional	  reasons:	   informal	  bargaining	   is	  arguably	   faster,	  whereas	  formal	  bargaining	  provides	  transparency	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  democratic	  process.	  The	  question	  we	  address	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  whether	  the	  formality	  of	  bargaining	  also	  systematically	  affects	  the	  bargaining	  outcome.	  This	  is	  important	  for	  understanding	  institutional	   choice	   and	   parliamentary	   procedures,	   and	   therefore	   for	   a	   better	  understanding	  of	  the	  way	  (economic)	  policies	  are	  made.	  	  That	  the	  bargaining	  procedure	  can	  drastically	  affect	  the	  outcome	  has	  been	  rec-­‐ognized	  at	  least	  since	  the	  research	  boom	  on	  spatial	  voting	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  If	  the	  procedure	   favors	   specific	   negotiators	   (e.g.,	   through	   the	   order	   of	   voting,	   agenda-­‐setting	  power,	  or	  proposal	  and	  voting	  rights)	  the	  outcome	  may	  crucially	  depend	  on	  it	  (e.g.,	  McKelvey	  1976,	  1979,	  Romer	  &	  Rosenthal,	  1978,	  Schofield	  1978,	  McCarty,	  2000).	  Importantly,	  the	  effect	  of	  formality	  is	  different	  than	  that	  of	  such	  variations	  in	  formal	  procedures,	  on	  at	  least	  two	  accounts.	  First,	  the	  difference	  between	  formal	  and	   informal	   bargaining	   cannot	   be	   captured	   in	   terms	   of	   changing	   the	   agenda	   or	  proposal	  or	  voting	  rights.	  Second,	  moving	  from	  a	  formal	  to	  informal	  bargaining	  or	  vice	   versa	   does	   not	   prima	   facie	   favor	   specific	   negotiators	   in	   any	   obvious	   way	  (whereas	  reallocating	  agenda	  power	  does,	  of	  course).	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  two	   is	   that	   informal	  bargaining	  provides	  much	  more	   flexibility	   to	   the	  bargaining	  parties.	  It	  does	  not	  give	  more	  flexibility	  to	  some	  parties	  than	  to	  others,	  however.	  	  Intuitively,	   the	   choice	   of	   how	  much	   weight	   to	   put	   on	   formal	   versus	   informal	  procedures	   may	   be	   determined	   by	   strategic	   considerations	   (Elster,	   1998,	  Stasavage,	   2004). For	   instance,	   parties	   with	   a	   strong	   bargaining	   position	   may	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prefer	  backrooms	  and	  wish	  to	  reserve	  formal	  voting	  for	  well	  negotiated	  deals.	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   parties	   with	   more	   extreme	   positions	   might	   prefer	   to	   avoid	  backrooms	   and	   follow	   the	  more	   formal	   procedures	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   their	   pro-­‐posals	  to	  have	  a	  chance	  of	  success.	  This	  study	  intends	  to	  help	  us	  better	  understand	  such	  preferences.	  	  More	  specifically,	  we	  compare	  two	  bargaining	  procedures,	  which	  we	  believe	  are	  representative	   for	   formal	   and	   informal	   bargaining	   in	   the	   field.	   To	   obtain	   a	   clean	  comparison,	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  bargaining	  procedure	  is	  ‘fair’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  does	  not	  prima	  facie	  favor	  any	  negotiator.	  In	  this	  important	  way,	  our	  study	  differs	  from	  the	  legislative	  bargaining	  literature	  of	  the	  1970s	  discussed	  above.	  The	  main	  ques-­‐tion	  we	  address	   is	  whether	   the	   increased	   flexibility	   of	   the	   informal	   compared	   to	  the	  formal	  procedure	  affects	  the	  legislative	  outcome.	  In	  addition,	  if	  it	  does,	  does	  it	  do	  so	  for	  purely	  strategic	  reasons	  or	  do	  psychological	  effects	  play	  a	  role?	  To	  pro-­‐vide	  an	  answer	  to	  these	  questions	  we	  analyze	  legislative	  bargaining	  both	  theoreti-­‐cally	  and	  in	  a	  controlled	  laboratory	  experiment.	  	  In	  the	  informal	  procedure,	  players	  can	  freely	  make	  and	  accept	  proposals	  at	  any	  time.1	  Note	  that	  this	  means	  that	  multiple	  proposals	  may	  be	  on	  the	  table	  simultane-­‐ously.	  We	   did	   not	   choose	   for	   a	   completely	   unstructured	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   setting,	   but	  instead	   opted	   for	   a	   computerized	   setting	   where	   players	   can	   make	   and	   accept	  proposals	   in	   continuous	   time.	  This	   allows	  us	   to	   analyze	   the	  procedure	   as	   a	   non-­‐cooperative	   game	  and	   to	   collect	   data	   on	   the	  bargaining	  process.	  We	  believe	   that	  the	   procedure	   is	   sufficiently	   unrestricted	   to	   be	   representative	   for	   informal	   bar-­‐gaining	  like	  that	  which	  takes	  place	  in	  in	  parliamentary	  backrooms.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  the	   procedure	   is	   also	   not	   restrictive	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   imposes	   no	   strategic	  constraints	   on	   the	   players.	   In	   the	   formal	   procedure,	   proposals	   and	   voting	   are	  regulated	   by	   a	   finite,	   closed-­‐rule	   Baron-­‐Ferejohn	   (1989)	   alternating	   offers	  scheme.2	  Though	   there	   are	   potentially	   very	   many	   fair	   formal	   procedures,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  the	  1970s,	  several	  experiments	  used	  informal	  bargaining	  procedures	  to	  compare	  the	  many	  cooperative	   solution	   concepts	   that	   had	   been	   proposed.	   Amongst	   the	   first	   were	   Fiorina	   &	   Plott	  (1978).	   The	   procedures	   used	   tend	   to	   be	   rather	   different	   from	   ours,	   however.	  More	   importantly,	  these	  studies	  do	  not	  compare	  their	  informal	  procedure	  to	  a	  formal	  procedure,	  nor	  do	  they	  model	  it	  as	  a	  non-­‐cooperative	  game.	  2	  Baron	  &	  Ferejohn	  (1987)	  compare	  open	  and	  closed	  amendment	  rules	  and	  find	  distinct	  equilib-­‐ria.	  Note	  that	  both	  settings	  constitute	  formal	  bargaining	  procedures.	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Baron	   Ferejohn	   framework	   is	   widely	   taken	   to	   be	   a	   suitable	   model	   for	   studying	  formal	   legislative	   bargaining.3	  Our	   procedure	   is	   an	   elementary	   Baron-­‐Ferejohn	  scheme.	  We	  study	  the	  effects	  of	  formality	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  three-­‐player	  legislative	  bar-­‐gaining	   setting.	   The	   game	   is	   a	   straightforward	   extension	   of	   the	   standard	   one-­‐dimensional	   median	   voter	   setting	   (Black,	   1948;	   1958)	   and	   has	   the	   following	  motivation.	   In	   the	  standard	  setting,	   the	  median	  player’s	   ideal	  point	   is	   the	  unique	  (strong)	  core	  outcome	  irrespective	  of	  the	  location	  of	  others’	  ideal	  points	  (as	  long	  as	  they	   are	   on	   the	   same	   dimension).	   However,	   intuitively	   one	  may	   expect	   that	   the	  outcome	   of	   a	   legislative	   bargaining	   process	   or	   the	   coalition	   supporting	   this	   out-­‐come	  is	  less	  stable	  if	  preferences	  are	  far	  apart	  −i.e.,	  if	  polarization	  is	  strong−,	  even	  if	  the	  policy	  space	  seems	  unidimensional.	  One	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  disagreement	  point	  may	  well	  lie	  outside	  of	  the	  line	  on	  which	  all	  policy	  proposals	  are	  defined.	  This	  is	  an	  issue	  we	  believe	  has	  hardly	  been	  appreciated	  in	  the	  literature.4	  Such	  a	  situa-­‐tion	  may	  occur	  for	  various	  reasons.5	  First,	  a	  decision	  often	  involves	  a	  new	  type	  of	  policy	  or	  project	  so	  that	  the	  status	  quo	  may	  not	  fall	  in	  the	  space	  under	  considera-­‐tion.	  Second,	  if	  the	  disagreement	  point	  consists	  in	  the	  termination	  of	  a	  project	  or	  a	  coalition,	   then	   it	   may	   involve	   significant	   transaction	   costs	   (e.g.,	   involving	   new	  elections).	   If	   so,	   the	  disagreement	  point	  will	  be	  of	  a	  qualitatively	  different	  nature	  than	  the	  issue	  under	  negotiation.	  An	  example	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  the	  environments	  we	  are	  thinking	  of.	  Imagine	  a	  legislature	   that	   consists	   of	   three	   factions	   (doves,	   moderates	   and	   hawks)	   and	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  work	   by	   Baron	   and	   Ferejohn,	   amongst	  many	   others,	  Merlo	  &	  Wilson	  (1995),	  McCarty	  (2000),	  Diermeier,	  Eraslan	  &	  Merlo	  (2003),	  Battaglini	  &	  Coate	  (2008)	  and	  Banks	  &	  Duggan	  (2000,	  2006).	  These	  models	  tend	  to	  reach	  similar	  conclusions	  about	  agenda	  setting	  power.	  The	   first	   proposal	   is	   often	   accepted	   in	   equilibrium,	   since	   players	   know	   which	   proposals	   would	  subsequently	  be	  accepted	  or	  rejected.	  This	  gives	  a	  great	  advantage	  to	  the	  player	  chosen	  to	  make	  the	  first	   proposal	   (Palfrey	   (2006)).	   Experiments,	   however,	   only	   partly	   corroborate	   these	   theoretical	  findings	   (McKelvey	   (1991),	   Diermeier	  &	  Morton	   (2005),	   Frechette,	  Morelli	   &	   Kagel	   (2005)).	   The	  first	   proposer	   does	   indeed	   have	   an	   advantage,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   as	   large	   as	   theoretically	   predicted,	  though	   the	   advantage	   increases	   if	   communication	   is	   allowed	   (Agranov	   and	   Tergiman	   (2014)).	  Moreover,	  the	  first	  proposal	  is	  sometimes	  rejected,	  leading	  to	  ‘delay’.	  4	  The	  only	  exception	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  is	  Romer	  &	  Rosenthal	  (1978),	  who	  make	  a	  similar	  observa-­‐tion	  when	  they	  compare	  competitive	  majority	  rule	  to	  a	  controlled	  agenda	  setting	  mechanism.	  They	  do	  not	  consider	  polarization.	  5	  See	  Eliaz,	  Ray	  &	  Razin	  (2007)	  for	  a	  theoretical	  study	  of	  bargaining	  over	  two	  alternatives,	  with	  varying	  disagreement	  payoffs.	  For	  our	  purposes	  their	  study	  is	  limited,	  due	  to	  restriction	  to	  (i)	  two	  alternatives	  and	  (ii)	  cases	  where	  everyone	  prefers	  agreement	  to	  disagreement.	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deciding	  on	  the	  renewal	  of	  a	  budget	  for	  an	  ongoing	  war.	  No	  single	  faction	  holds	  a	  majority	  and	  any	  coalition	  of	  two	  does.	  Doves	  prefer	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  current	  war	  budget,	  moderates	  want	  no	  change	  and	  hawks	  would	  like	  an	  increase.	  Preferences	  are	   single-­‐peaked	   with	   respect	   to	   budget	   revisions.	   The	   option	   to	   end	   the	   war	  (‘retreat’)	  serves	  as	  a	  disagreement	  point,	  which	  cannot	  simply	  be	  represented	  as	  a	  budget	  revision.	  (Retreating	  is	  qualitatively	  distinct	  from	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  budget	  to	  zero	  and,	   furthermore,	   spending	  5	  billion	  on	   retreating	   is	  quite	  different	   from	  spending	  this	  amount	  on	  war	  efforts.)	  Preferences	  are	  such	  that	  all	  parties	  prefer	  some	  revisions	  to	  retreating.	  Polarization	  is	  then	  defined	  as	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  ideal	  revisions	  of	  the	  factions	  (relative	  to	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  retreating6)	  and	  captures	   the	   extent	  of	   divergence	  of	   interests.	   Polarization	  will	  most	   likely	  drive	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  outcome.	  If	  polarization	  is	  weak,	  then	  the	  factions’	  preferences	  lie	  close	   together	  and	  retreating	   is	  a	  relatively	  unattractive	  agreement.	  Hence,	  all	  coalitions	  will	  prefer	  the	  median	  ideal	  to	  retreating.	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  can	  use	  Black’s	  Median	  Voter	  Theorem	  (1948,	  1958)	  to	  predict	  that	  the	  moderates’	  ideal	  point	  will	  prevail.	  If	  the	  ideal	  revisions	  are	  very	  far	  apart,	  then	  polarization	  is	  strong.	  In	  this	  case	  retreating	  is	  relatively	  attractive	  and	  there	  are	  no	  revisions	  that	  any	  coalition	  prefers	   to	   retreating.	  With	  moderate	  polarization,	  we	  get	   a	   cyclical	  pattern.	  Both	  doves	   and	  hawks	  prefer	   retreating	   to	   the	  unaltered	  budget;	  however,	  moderates	  and	  doves	  prefer	  some	  negative	  revisions	  to	  retreating;	  and	  moderates	  and	  hawks	  prefer	  the	  unaltered	  budget	  to	  negative	  revisions.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  the	  legislature	  may	  decide.	  Intuitively,	  one	  may	  expect	  the	  moderates	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  bargaining	  power,	  as	  doves	  and	  hawks	  can	  only	  coordinate	  on	  retreating.	  	  Our	  model	  and	  experimental	  design	  take	  the	  same	  basic	   form	  as	  this	  example.	  The	   point	   of	   departure	   is	   a	   bargaining	  problem	   in	   a	  median	   voter	   setting	   that	   is	  modified	   to	   have	   an	   exterior	   disagreement	   point.	   Then,	  we	   introduce	   the	   formal	  bargaining	   procedure	   to	   obtain	   the	   formal	   bargaining	   game	   and	   the	   informal	  bargaining	  procedure	  to	  obtain	  the	  informal	  bargaining	  game.	  We	  analyze	  coopera-­‐tive	   solutions	   for	   the	   bargaining	   problem	   and	   for	   both	   games	   we	   derive	   non-­‐cooperative	  equilibrium	  predictions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  In	   particular,	   relative	   to	   the	   distance	   between	   a	   player’s	   ideal	   budget	   and	   the	   budget(s)	   she	  finds	  equally	  attractive	  as	  retreating.	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The	  bargaining	  outcome	  will	  typically	  depend	  on	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  the	  bargaining	  problem	  (i.c.,	  the	  extent	  of	  polarization).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	   procedure	   may	   also	   depend	   on	   these	   characteristics.	   More	   specifically,	   the	  relevance	  of	  formality	  may	  arguably	  be	  dependent	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  bargain-­‐ing	   problem	   has	   a	   core.7	  Our	   setup	   allows	   us	   to	   obtain	   distinct	   outcomes	   with	  respect	  to	  the	  core	  by	  varying	  the	  level	  of	  polarization.	  When	  polarization	  is	  weak,	  the	  core	  consists	  of	   the	  median	   ideal	  and	  with	  strong	  polarization	  the	  core	   is	   the	  disagreement	  point.	  With	  moderate	  polarization,	  the	  core	  is	  empty.	  	  The	   non-­‐cooperative	   predictions	   depend	   on	   the	   procedure.8	  For	   the	   formal	  game,	  we	  derive	  a	  unique	   (refined)	   subgame	  perfect	   equilibrium	  (SPE)	   that	   con-­‐verges	   (with	   the	   number	   of	   bargaining	   rounds)	   to	   the	   core	   element	   when	   this	  exists.	  It	  typically	  does	  not	  converge	  at	  all	  when	  the	  core	  is	  empty.	  In	  the	  informal	  game	  the	  disagreement	  point	  and	  all	  points	  between	  the	  players’	  ideal	  points	  can	  be	   supported	   as	   an	   SPE-­‐outcome,	   irrespective	   of	   the	   extent	   of	   polarization.	   In	  addition,	  the	  equilibrium	  set	  cannot	  be	  refined	  in	  any	  standard	  way.	  Our	  interpre-­‐tation	  is	  that	  informality	  offers	  so	  much	  strategic	  flexibility	  that	  strategic	  consider-­‐ations	  alone	  cannot	  identify	  an	  outcome.	  	  From	   our	   experiments,	   we	   have	   two	  main	   findings:	   polarization	  matters	   and	  formality	  matters.	  Polarization	  has	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  the	  outcome.	  In	  accordance	  with	  theory,	  the	  median	  player	  is	  significantly	  worse	  off	  with	  moderate	  than	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  When	   the	   core	   is	   empty,	   all	   outcomes	   can	   be	   supported	   by	   some	   agenda-­‐setting	   institution	  (McKelvey	   (1976;	   1979),	   Schofield	   (1978)).	   This	   is	   important,	   because	   the	   core	   is	   empty	   under	  many	  conditions	  (Gillies	  (1953),	  Plott	  (1967),	  Riker	  (1980),	  Le	  Breton	  (1987),	  Saari	  (1997)).	  If	  the	  core	  is	  non-­‐empty,	  the	  (non-­‐cooperative)	  equilibrium	  outcome	  for	  many	  procedures	  tends	  to	  lie	  in	  it	   (Perry	   &	   Reny	   (1994),	   Baron	   (1996),	   Banks	   &	   Duggan	   (2000)).	   There	   is	   indeed	   experimental	  evidence	  on	  the	  stability	  of	  core-­‐outcomes	  (Fiorina	  &	  Plott	  (1978),	  McKelvey	  &	  Ordeshook	  (1984),	  Palfrey	  (2006)).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  outcome	  is	  sometimes	  sensitive	  to	  fairness	  considerations	  (Isaac	   &	   Plott	   (1978),	   Eavey	   &	  Miller	   (1984)).	   Structure	  may	  matter	   even	   if	   there	   is	   a	   core,	   for	  instance,	  if	  some	  procedures	  are	  considered	  fairer	  than	  others	  (Bolton,	  Brandts,	  &	  Ockenfels,	  2005).	  8	  Two	  theoretical	  breakthroughs	  have	  allowed	  us	  to	  overcome	  challenges	  in	  studying	  the	  effects	  of	   formality.	   First,	   for	   a	   long	   time	   many	   cooperative	   solution	   concepts	   have	   been	   advanced	   for	  situations	   in	   which	   the	   core	   is	   empty	   but	   none	   found	   broad	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   support.	  Miller’s	  (1980)	  uncovered	  set	  as	  a	  generalization	  of	   the	  core	  drew	  theoretical	  support	  (Shepsle	  &	  Weingast	   (1984),	   Banks	   (1985),	   Cox	   (1987),	   Feld,	   Grofman,	   Hartley,	   Kilgour	   &	   Miller	   (1987)).	  However,	   systematic	   empirical	   tests	   were	   problematic,	   as	   it	   was	   impossible	   to	   compute	   the	  uncovered	   set	   in	  most	   cases.	   	   This	   problem	  was	   largely	   solved	   by	  Bianco,	   Lynch,	  Miller	  &	   Sened	  (2006;	  2008),	  who	  developed	  an	  algorithm	  to	  find	  the	  uncovered	  set.	  By	  doing	  so,	  they	  managed	  to	  find	  solid	  empirical	   support	  using	  data	   from	  many	  old	  and	  new	  experiments.	   Second,	   continuous	  time	  bargaining	  has	  made	  the	  non-­‐cooperative	  analysis	  of	  low-­‐structure	  settings	  possible	  (Simon	  &	  Stinchcombe	  (1989),	  Perry	  &	  Reny	  (1993)).	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weak	  polarization.	  However,	  we	  find	  that	  increased	  polarization	  hurts	  the	  median	  player	  and	  does	  so	  even	  at	  weak	  levels	  when	  her	  most	  preferred	  outcome	  remains	  the	   unique	   core	   element.	   Our	   experimental	   findings	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   due	   to	  negotiations	  (especially	   in	  the	  first	  half	  of	   the	  experiment)	   leading	  to	  equal	  earn-­‐ings	   for	   the	   coalition	   partners	   (reminiscent	   of	   Bolton,	   Chatterjee	   and	   McGinn	  (2003)).	   Such	   considerations	   become	   less	   important	   as	   negotiators	   gain	   more	  experience.	   After	   players	   have	   repeatedly	   played	   the	   game	   (in	   ever-­‐changing	  groups),	   competition	   between	   coalitions	   is	   strengthened	   and	   the	   position	   of	   the	  median	  player	  also	  becomes	  stronger.	  Our	  second	  result	  is	  that	  the	  formality	  of	  the	  bargaining	  procedure	  matters.	  The	  median	   player	   is	   significantly	   better	   off	   with	   the	   informal	   than	   with	   the	   formal	  procedure.	  One	  plausible	  cause	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  flexibility	  in	  making	  proposals	  at	  any	   time	   (even	   if	   there	   are	   already	   other	   proposals	   on	   the	   table)	   increases	   her	  ability	   to	   exploit	   her	   superior	   bargaining	   position,	   as	   observed	   by	   Drouvelis,	  Montero	  &	  Sefton	  (2010)	  in	  a	  different	  setting.	  This	  points	  to	  the	  more	  general	  idea	  that	  parties	   in	  a	   superior	  bargaining	  position	  will	  prefer	   institutions	   that	   impose	  less	  structure	  on	  the	  bargaining	  procedure.	   It	   is	   important	  to	  note,	  however,	   that	  this	  intuition	  is	  not	  supported	  by	  our	  theoretical	  analysis	  of	  the	  formal	  and	  infor-­‐mal	  procedures.	  The	  theory	  presented	  in	  section	  3	  is	  inconclusive	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  formality.	  	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  Section	  2	  models	  the	  bar-­‐gaining	   problem	   as	   a	   cooperative	   game	   and	   derives	   solutions	   for	   it.	   Section	   3	  describes	   and	   solves	   the	   non-­‐cooperative	   games	   for	   the	   formal	   and	   informal	  bargaining	  procedures.	  Our	  experimental	  design	  is	  presented	  in	  section	  4	  and	  the	  experimental	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  section	  5.	  Section	  6	  concludes.	  
2. The	  Bargaining	  Problem	  and	  Cooperative	  Solutions	  
Formally,	  the	  bargaining	  problem	  is	  represented	  by	  Γ	  =	  Γ(N,	  Z,ui,W)	  and	  consists	  of	  a	  finite	  set	  N	  of	  players,	  thought	  of	  as	  factions	  in	  a	  legislature;	  a	  collection	  W	  of	  subsets	   of	  N,	   thought	   of	   as	  winning	   coalitions;	   a	   set	  Z	   of	   alternatives;	   and	  utility	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functions	  ui,	   one	   for	   each	  player	   i	  ∈	  N	   	   representing	   i’s	   preferences	  over	  Z.	  Note	  that	   although	  winning	   coalitions	   have	   been	   specified,	   nothing	   has	   yet	   been	   said	  about	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  itself.	  Procedures	  governing	  this	  process	  will	  be	  described	  and	  formalized	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  In	   the	   bargaining	   problems	   studied	   here,	   three	   players	   (N	   =	   {1,2,3})	  bargain	  over	  the	  set	  of	  alternatives	  represented	  by	  Z	  ≡	  R	  ∪	  δ	  with	  R	  denoting	  the	  set	  of	  real	  numbers	  and	  δ	  the	  disagreement	  point.	  Each	  player	  i	  ∈	  N	  has	  an	  ideal	  point	  zi	  ∈	  Z.	  Without	  loss	  of	  generality	  we	  normalize	  by	  setting	  z1	  =	  −a	  <	  0,	  z2	  =	  0,	  and	  z3	  =	  b	  >	  0,	  with	  b	  ≥	  a.	  Hence,	  the	  ideal	  point	  of	  player	  2,	  the	  median	  player,	  is	  z	  =	  0.	  For	  players	  1	  and	  3,	  the	  wing	  players,	  z1	  is	  normalized	  to	  lie	  closer	  to	  0	  than	  z3.	  We	  interpret	  the	  distance,	  a,	  between	  the	  closer	  wing	  player	  and	  the	  median	  player	  as	  a	  measure	  of	   the	   polarization	   of	   players’	   preferences.	   We	   shall	   distinguish	   three	   cases	   of	  respectively,	  weak	  (a	  ≤	  1),	  moderate	  (1	  <	  a	  <	  2),	  and	  strong	  polarization	  (a	  ≥	  2).	  Preferences	  of	  all	  players	  are	  single-­‐peaked	  on	  R	  and	  represented	  by	  piecewise	  linear	   von	  Neumann-­‐Morgenstern	   utility	   functions	  ui(z)	   =	   1	   –	   |z	  –	  zi|	  We	   further	  assume	  that	  the	  utility	  attributed	  to	  the	  disagreement	  point	  is	  normalized	  at	  0,	  that	  is,	  ui(δ)	  =	  0,	  for	  all	  i	  ∈	  N.	  Hence,	  each	  player	  has	  an	  open	  interval	  of	  outcomes	  with	  strictly	  positive	  values;	  to	  wit,	  (	  −a	  –	  1,	  −a	  +	  1	  )	  for	  player	  1,	  (	  –1,	  1	  )	  for	  player	  2,	  and	   (	  b	   –	  1,	  b	   +	  1	   )	   for	  player	  3.	  Note	   that	   the	  endpoints	  of	   these	   intervals	   yield	  utility	  of	  0,	  while	  the	  outcomes	  outside	  of	  these	  intervals	  are	  strictly	  worse	  for	  the	  respective	   players	   than	   the	   disagreement	   point	   δ.	   Figure	   1	   depicts	   this	   payoff	  structure.	  	  
	  Figure	  1	  The	  figure	  shows	  the	  payoff	  structure	  of	  Γ.	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As	   for	  winning	   coalitions	  W,	  we	   assume	   that	   any	  majority	   of	   two	   players	   can	  implement	  any	  z	  ∈	  Z	  as	  the	  outcome.	  This	  can	  be	  achieved	  in	  various	  ways,	  deter-­‐mined	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  bargaining	  process	  (see	  section	  3).	  
Γ	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   cooperative	   game	   and	  more	   precisely	   as	   a	   coalitional	  game	   without	   transferable	   payoff.9	  We	   start	   by	   defining	   the	   dominating	   and	  covering	  relations	  for	  any	  given	  Γ(N,	  Z,	  ui,	  W).	  	  
Definition	  1	  Let	  z,	  z’	  ∈	  Z.	  	  We	  say	  that	  (i)	  	   z’	  dominates	  z,	  and	  write	  z’	  >	  z,	   	   if	   there	   is	  a	  winning	  coalition	  M	  ∈	  W	  such	  
that	  all	  members	  in	  M	  strictly	  prefer	  z’	  to	  z;	  	  (ii)	  	  z’	  covers	  z,	  and	  write	  z’Cz,	  	  if	  z’	  >	  z,	  	  and	  z’’	  >	  z’	  ⇒	  z’’	  >	  z,	  for	  all	  z’’	  ∈	  Z	  	  The	  assumption	  that	  the	  disagreement	  point	  𝛿	  does	  not	  coincide	  with	  a	  point	  on	  the	   line	  R	   is	   important.	   If	  δ	   did	   lie	   in	  R,	   then	  we	  would	  have	   a	   standard	  median	  voter	  setting	  and	  the	  median	  ideal	  0	  would	  dominate	  all	  other	  possible	  outcomes.	  The	  counter-­‐positive	  equivalent	  of	  Definition	  1	  reads	  as	  follows.	  	  
Definition	  2	  For	  an	  alternative	  ,	  z	  ∈	  Z	  we	  say	  that	  (i)	  	  z	  is	  undominated	  if	  for	  every	  z’	  the	  set	  of	  players	  who	  strictly	  prefer	  z’	  over	  z	  is	  
not	  a	  winning	  coalition;	  (ii)	   	  z	  is	  uncovered	  if	  for	  every	  z’	  which	  dominates	  z	  there	  is	  a	  z’’	  which	  dominates	  
z’	  and	  does	  not	  dominate	  z.	  	  To	  obtain	  a	  solution	  we	  look	  at	  the	  core	  and,	  when	  the	  core	  is	  empty,	  at	  the	  uncov-­‐ered	  set,	  which	  is	  a	  generalization	  of	  the	  core.	  These	  are	  defined	  by:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Note	  that	  individual	  players	  cannot	  achieve	  any	  outcome	  by	  themselves	  and	  hence	  the	  payoffs	  available	  to	  singleton	  coalitions	  are	  not	  independent	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  complementary	  coalition.	  Hence,	   under	   some	   definitions	   it	   would	   fall	   outside	   of	   the	   class	   of	   coalitional	   games	   with	   non-­‐transferable	  utility.	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Definition	  3	  	  (i)	   The	  core	  C (Γ)	  of	  	  Γ	  is	  the	  set	  of	  all	  points	  in	  Z	  that	  are	  undominated;	  	  (ii)	   The	  uncovered	  set	  U (Γ)	  of	  Γ	  is	  the	  set	  of	  all	  points	  in	  Z	  that	  are	  uncovered.	  	   	  Intuitively,	  the	  uncovered	  set	  is	  a	  ‘two	  step	  core.’	  If	  an	  outcome	  z	  is	  uncovered,	  there	  might	  be	  an	  outcome	  z’	   that	  dominates	   it,	  but	   this	  outcome	  z’	  will	   itself	  be	  dominated	  by	   an	  outcome	  z’’	   that	   does	  not	   dominate	  z.	   This	  means	   for	   instance,	  that	  forward-­‐looking	  negotiators	  might	  be	  hesitant	  to	  move	  away	  from	  a	  point	  in	  the	  uncovered	  set.	  The	  uncovered	  set	  has	  several	  appealing	  theoretical	  properties.	  It	   is	  never	  empty,	   is	  equal	   to	   the	  core	   if	   the	   latter	   is	  nonempty	  and	  strict	   (Miller,	  1980),	   contains	   all	   Von	   Neumann	   Morgenstern	   sets	   (McKelvey,	   1986)	   and	   it	  subsumes	  the	  Banks	  set	  (Banks,	  1985).10	  McKelvey	  argues	  that	  the	  uncovered	  set	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  “useful	  generalization	  of	  the	  core	  when	  the	  core	  does	  not	  exist”	  (1986).	  More	  recently,	  this	  concept	  has	  also	  attracted	  significant	  empirical	  support	  (Bianco,	  Lynch,	  Miller	  &	  Sened	  2006;	  2008).	  	  Whereas	   the	   uncovered	   set	   is	   typically	   large	   and	   difficult	   to	   calculate,	   in	   our	  bargaining	  problem	  it	  is	  small	  and	  simple.11	  Table	  1	  gives	  the	  core	  and	  uncovered	  set	  for	  our	  bargaining	  problems.	  	   	  TABLE	   1 COOPERATIVE	  SOLUTIONS	  Polarization	   C(Γ)	   U(Γ)	  weak:	  a	  ≤	  1	   0	   0	  moderate:	  1<a<2	   a	  <	  b	   ∅	   {–a	  +	  1,	  0,	  δ}	  a	  =	  b	   {–a	  +	  1,	  0,	  b	  –	  1,	  δ}	  strong:	  a	  ≥	  2	   δ	   δ	  
Notes:	   For	   Γ=Γ	   (N,	   Z,	   ui,W),	   the	   table	   gives	   the	   elements	   in	   the	   core	  (C(Γ))and	  uncovered	   set	   (U(Γ))	   for	   the	   levels	  of	  polarization	  distinguished	   in	  the	  first	  column.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  These	  different	  papers	  prove	  these	  relations	  under	  slightly	  differing	  conditions.	  11	  In	  addition,	  in	  our	  game	  the	  uncovered	  set	  is	  refined	  in	  a	  nice	  way	  by	  the	  von	  Neumann	  Mor-­‐
genstern	  set	  and	  the	  bargaining	  set,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  unique.	  More	  details	  are	  given	  in	  Appendix	  A.	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When	  polarization	   is	  weak	  or	  strong,	   the	  core	   is	  nonempty	  and	  coincides	  with	  the	  uncovered	  set.	  It	  always	  holds	  that	  players	  1	  and	  2	  prefer	  the	  median	  ideal	  to	  all	  points	  right	  of	  it,	  whereas	  players	  2	  and	  3	  prefer	  the	  median	  ideal	  to	  all	  points	  left	   of	   it.	   In	   addition,	  when	  polarization	   is	  weak,	   players	   1	   and	  2	   also	   prefer	   the	  median	   ideal	   to	   the	   disagreement	   point.	  Hence	   it	   dominates	   all	   points,	   and,	   as	   a	  consequence,	  also	  covers	  them	  all.	  Thus,	  if	  polarization	  is	  weak,	  the	  median	  ideal	  is	  the	  singleton	  core	  and	  uncovered	  set.	  When	  polarization	  is	  strong,	  no	  point	  on	  the	  line	   exists	   that	   two	   players	   prefer	   to	   the	  median	   ideal.	   Hence,	   the	   disagreement	  point	  dominates	  all	  points	  on	  the	  line	  and	  constitutes	  the	  core	  and	  uncovered	  set.	  From	  a	  behavioral	  perspective,	   this	  case	  seems	   less	   interesting,	  as	  no	  alternative	  outcome	  to	  the	  disagreement	  point	  seems	  viable.	  When	   polarization	   is	  moderate,	   we	   get	   a	   circular	   dominance	   pattern	   and	   the	  core	   is	   empty:	   the	   median	   ideal	   dominates	   all	   other	   points	   on	   the	   line,	   but	   is	  dominated	   by	   the	   disagreement	   point.	   The	   disagreement	   point	   itself	   is	   in	   turn	  dominated	  by	  some	  points	  on	  the	  line	  (which	  are	  dominated	  by	  the	  median	  ideal	  etc.).	   This	   also	  means	   that	   the	  median	   ideal	   and	   the	   disagreement	   point	   do	   not	  cover	  each	  other;	  they	  are	  uncovered.	  Furthermore,	  the	  point	  closest	  to	  the	  median	  player	   that	   is	   not	   dominated	   by	   the	   disagreement	   point,	   –a	   +	   1,	   is	   uncovered	   as	  well.	  (The	  same	  holds	  for	  a	  –	  1	  if	  a	  =	  b).	  Consequently,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  uncovered	  set	  consists	  of	  three	  or	  four	  elements:	  the	  median	  ideal,	  the	  disagreement	  point,	  –a	  +	  1	  and,	  if	  a	  =	  b,	  a	  –	  1.	  For	  technical	  details	  on	  the	  dominance	  relations	  and	  the	  cooperative	  solutions,	  see	  Appendix	  A.	  
3. Solutions	  of	  Non-­‐Cooperative	  Games	  	  
We	  now	   impose	  procedures	  on	   the	  bargaining	  problem	  described	   in	  section	  2	  and	   analyze	   the	   resulting	   non-­‐cooperative	   games.	   One	   may	   think	   of	   this	   as	   the	  legislature	   selecting	   exactly	   one	   element	   of	   the	   set	   of	   feasible	   alternatives	   Z	  by	  means	  of	   a	  procedure	  established	   (or	   agreed	  upon)	   in	   advance.	   Formally,	   such	  a	  procedure	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  extensive	  game.	  We	  shall	  present	  and	  discuss	  two	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such	   games,	   exemplary	   for	   two	   important	   frameworks	   for	   legislative	   bargaining,	  voting	  and	  open	  bargaining.	  We	  do	  so	  by	   introducing	  a	   ‘formal’	  and	  an	   ‘informal’	  bargaining	  procedure	  to	  Γ	  =	  Γ(N,	  Z,ui,W).	  
3.1. Formal	  procedure	  
We	  begin	  with	  a	  formal-­‐procedure	  framework	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  an	  outcome	  in	  





	  12	  	  





	  13	  	  
that	  of	  player	  3,	  will	  be	  rejected.16	  The	  equilibrium	  outcome	  of	   	  may	  depend	  in	  complicated	  ways	  on	  the	  number	  of	  bargaining	  rounds,	  T.17	  Hence,	  our	  approach	  is	  to	  look	  at	  whether	  the	  equilibrium	  outcome	  converges	  as	  T	  increases.	  We	  say	  that	  for	   given	   values	   of	   a	   and	   b	   the	   equilibrium	   outcome	   converges	   if	   there	   exists	   a	  probability	  distribution	  𝜇!,!∗   on	  Z	  such	  that	  lim!→! 𝜇! =   𝜇!,!∗ .	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  weak	  convergence	   of	   probability	   measures	   (Billingsley,	   1999).	   If	   no	   such	   limit	   exists,	  then	  we	   say	   that	   the	   outcome	  does	  not	   converge.	  The	   equilibrium	  outcome	   con-­‐verges	  to	  some	  single	  z	  ∈	  Z	  if	  𝜇!,!∗   is	  concentrated	  at	  z	  ∈	  Z,	  i.e.	  𝜇!,!∗   =	  1.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  summarize	  the	  SPE	  of	   	  in	  the	  following	  proposition:	  
	  
Proposition	  1	  (i)	   If	  0	  ≤	  a	  <	  1	  or	  a	  =	  b	  =	  1,	  the	  equilibrium	  outcome	  converges	  to	  0.	  For	  T	  suffi-­‐
ciently	  large	  the	  first	  round	  proposals	  are	  accepted	  without	  delay.	  (ii)	   If	  1	  ≤	  a	  ≤	  b	  <	  2	  and	  b	  >	  1,	  the	  equilibrium	  outcome	  does	  not	  converge	  except	  
for	  some	  patches	  of	  the	  values	  of	  a	  and	  b,	  and	  never	  to	  a	  single	  outcome	  in	  Z.	  (iii)	  If	  a	  ≥	  2,	  the	  equilibrium	  outcome	  is	  δ	  for	  sufficiently	  large	  T.	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Proposition	  1	  specifies	  the	  parameter	  configurations	  for	  which	  we	  have	  robust	  predictions.	  Note	  that	  legislative	  bargaining	  in	  the	  field	  can	  go	  through	  a	  substan-­‐tial	   number	   of	   rounds,	   but	   that	   the	   number	   is	   generally	   finite	   (due	   to	   time	   con-­‐straints,	  for	  example).	  If	  the	  outcome	  converges	  as	  the	  number	  of	  rounds	  increases,	  this	  allows	  for	  a	  stable	  prediction	  for	  such	  cases.19	  If	  there	  is	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  rounds,	  the	  prediction	  will	  not	  depend	  significantly	  on	  the	  exact	  number,	  on	  who	  gets	   to	  propose	   first	  or	  on	  the	  precise	  values	  of	  a	  and	  b.	   If	   the	  outcome	  does	  not	  converge,	   however,	   then	   the	   outcome	   will	   depend	   on	   all	   these	   parameters,	   and	  typically	  in	  a	  very	  sensitive	  and	  non-­‐linear	  way.	  20	  In	  our	  experiment	  we	  will	  use	  T	  =	  10.	  For	  this	  case,	  we	  can	  derive	  a	  unique	  prediction,	  whether	  the	  core	  is	  empty	  or	  not	   (See	   Table	   3	   below).	   When	   the	   core	   is	   nonempty,	   it	   does	   not	   matter	   much	  whether	  T	  is	  9,	  10,	  11,	  20	  or	  100	  or	  whether	  a=.4	  or	  a=.41	  or	  whether	  player	  1	  or	  player	  3	  starts.21,22	  When	   the	  core	   is	  empty,	  however,	   then	   the	  outcome	  depends	  crucially	   on	   all	   these	   parameters.	   Though	   we	   have	   predictions	   for	   the	   specific	  parameters	  of	  our	  experiment,	  they	  will	  be	  strongly	  affected	  by	  small	  changes.	  This	  makes	  the	  outcome	  hard	  to	  predict	  in	  practice.	  In	  addition,	  this	  arguably	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	   for	  players	   to	   coordinate	  on	   the	   equilibrium.	  Hence,	   Proposition	  1	  helps	  us	  understand	  when	  specific	  predictions	  for	  finite	  T	  are	  robust	  (i.c.,	  this	  is	  the	  case	  for	  (i)	  and	  (iii)).	  
3.2. Informal	  Procedure	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proposals	  is	  accepted	  lest	  the	  game	  ends	  with	  the	  disagreement	  point	  δ	  at	  time	  T.	  It	  has	  by	  now	  been	  well	  established	  that	  such	  a	  game	  with	  continuous	  time	  cannot	  be	  solved	  without	  further	  assumptions,	  however	  (Simon	  &	  Stinchcombe	  1989,	  Perry	  &	  Reny	  1993;	   1994).	  Drawing	   on	  Perry	   and	  Reny’s	   two-­‐player	   game	   (1994),	  we	  introduce	  a	  reaction	  and	  waiting	  time	  ρ.	  Our	  game	  is	   in	   important	  ways	  different	  from	  Perry	  and	  Reny	  (1994),	  nonetheless,	  as	  Γ	  can	  have	  an	  empty	  core	  and	  does	  not	  have	  transferable	  payoffs.	  	  The	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  are	  as	  follows.	  Player	  i	  can	  either	  be	  silent	  (ς),	   =	  ς,	  	  have	  a	  proposal	  on	  the	  table, =	  z,	  z	  ∈	  Z,	  or	  accept	  the	  proposal	  of	  another	  player	  j,	   =	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t	   if	   she	   is	   silent	   herself	  (𝑝!!! = 𝜍).25	  In	   addition,	   one	   can	   (naturally)	   not	   accept	   a	  proposal	  from	  a	  player	  who	  is	  silent.	  As	  soon	  as	  a	  proposal	  has	  been	  accepted,	  the	  accepted	  proposal	   is	   the	  outcome	  of	   the	   game.	   If	   no	  proposal	  has	  been	  accepted	  before	  or	  at	  t	  =	  T,	   then	  the	  outcome	  is	  the	  disagreement	  point	  δ.	  After	  a	  proposal	  has	  been	  accepted	  or	  when	  t>T,	  no	  player	  can	  move	  anymore.	  Formally,	  we	  always	  let	  the	  game	  end	  at	  t	  =	  T	  +	  𝜌.26	  	  To	  define	   strategies	   and	  derive	   equilibria,	  we	  need	   to	   introduce	   some	   further	  definitions.	  We	  do	  so	  in	  Appendix	  C,	  where	  we	  define	  strategies,	  prove	   	  is	  a	  well-­‐defined	   game	   and	   derive	   the	   set	   of	   subgame	   perfect	   equilibria.	   We	   obtain	   the	  following.	  	  
Proposition	  2	  The	  set	  of	  SPE	  outcomes	  contains	   –𝑎, 𝑏   ∪   𝛿	  for	  every	  continuous	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in	  many	   subgames	   of	   	  multiple	   actions	   per	   player	  will	   survive,	   so	   that	   hardly	  any	   strategy	   will	   eventually	   be	   eliminated	   in	   the	   complete	   game.	   In	   addition,	   a	  refinement	  based	  on	  trembling-­‐hand	  perfection	  (Selten,	  1975),	  if	  it	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	   continuous	   time	   and	   space,	   will	   not	   eliminate	   these	   unintuitive	   equilibrium-­‐outcomes	  either.	  For	  instance,	  the	  reason	  that	  player	  1	  does	  not	  propose	  0	  instead	  of	  b	   in	   the	  equilibrium	  discussed	  above,	   could	  be	   that	   she	   is	   afraid	   that	  player	  2	  might	   tremble	   and	   play	   b	   +	  𝜀  	  instead	   of	   b.	   Hence,	   there	   are	   few	   strategic	   re-­‐strictions	  on	  the	  equilibrium	  strategies	  in	  the	  informal	  game.	  	  Nonetheless,	   there	   are	   some	  points	   in	   the	   outcome	   set	   that	   strike	   us	   as	  more	  ‘likely’	   than	   others	   (for	   instance	   points	   in	   the	   uncovered	   set).	   Their	   plausibility	  might	  be	  the	  result	  of	  their	  focal	  nature	  due	  to	  the	  constellation	  of	  preferences	  and	  winning	  coalitions	  (which	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  cooperative	  solution	  concepts	  of	  the	  bargaining	  problem).	  	  
3.3 Overview	  of	  Theoretical	  Results	  
In	   Table	   2	   we	   summarize	   the	   main	   results	   obtained	   for	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	  equilibria	  of	  the	  two	  strategic	  games	  analyzed	  in	  this	  section,	  Γ!! 	  and	   ,	  together	  with	  the	  solutions	  of	  the	  cooperative	  game	  Γ.	  	  TABLE	   2	  THEORETICAL	  RESULTS	  MAIN	  CASES	  	   	   Polarization	  	   	   Weak:	  a<1	   Moderate:	  1<a<2	   Strong:	  a	  >	  2	  Cooperative	  Game	  
Γ	  (N,	  X,	  ui,	  W)	   Core	   0	   ∅	   𝛿	  Uncovered	  Set	   0	   {1−a,	  0,	  a−1*, 𝛿}	   𝛿	  Formal	  (convergence),	  Γ!! 	   0	   No	  convergence**	   𝛿	  Informal	  (for	  T	  ≥	  ρ),	   	   [-­‐a	  ,	  b]∪	  {  𝛿	  }	  ***	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An	  interesting	  question	  to	  ask	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘formality’,	  i.e.,	  what	  makes	  a	  bargaining	   setting	  more	  or	   less	   formal.	  To	   start,	  note	   that	  our	   ‘in-­‐formal’,	  continuous	  game	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  minimal	  set	  of	  rules,	  without	  which	  one	  could	  not	  define	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  game.	  From	  a	  practical	  point	  of	  view,	  these	  rules	  are	  not	  restrictive	  if	  the	  waiting	  and	  reaction	  times	  are	  sufficiently	  small.	  In	  contrast,	  our	   ‘formal’	  game	  has	  a	  very	  rigid	  set	  of	  rules	  governing	  who	  can	  make	  proposals	  and	  at	  what	  point	  in	  time.	  	  In	  our	  view,	  a	  Game	  A	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  more	  formal	  than	  a	  Game	  B,	  if	  A	  imposes	  additional	  rules	  to	  B.	  In	  this	  light,	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  with	  a	  proper	  randomization	  device	   (such	   as	   an	   external	   agent	   to	   chair	   the	  meeting),	   players	   in	   our	   informal	  game	  could	  agree	  to	  an	  additional	  set	  of	  rules	  that	  would	  result	  in	  our	  formal	  game.	  For	   instance,	   they	   could	   divide	   the	   time	  T	   in	  K	   intervals	   (of	   at	   least	  2𝜌).	   In	   each	  interval,	   they	   (or	   the	   external	   agent)	   randomly	   determines	   which	   person	   is	   al-­‐lowed	   to	  make	  a	  proposal	   (hence,	  disallowing	  multiple	  proposals	  on	   the	   table	  at	  the	   same	   time,	   as	   in	  our	   formal	   game),	   that	  person	   then	  makes	  a	  proposal,	   after	  which	  the	  others	  can	  accept	  it.	  This	  would	  de	  facto	  result	  in	  our	  formal	  game	  with	  
K	   rounds.	   Because	   imposing	   additional	   rules	   on	   our	   informal	   game	   yields	   the	  formal	  game,	  we	  conclude	  that	  our	  informal	  game	  is	  indeed	  less	  formal.	  
4. Experimental	  Procedures	  and	  Design	  
The	  experiment	  was	  run	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Research	  in	  Experimental	  Economics	  and	   political	   Decision	   making	   (CREED)	   of	   the	   University	   of	   Amsterdam.	   It	   was	  computerized	   using	   z-­‐Tree	   (Fischbacher,	   2007).	   An	   English	   translation	   of	   the	  Dutch	  experimental	  instructions	  is	  provided	  in	  online	  Appendix	  D.	  Subjects	  had	  to	  correctly	  answer	  a	  quiz	  before	  proceeding	  to	  the	  experiment.	  In	  total,	  102	  subjects	  were	  recruited	  from	  CREED’s	  subject	  pool.28	  They	  earned	  a	  €5	  show-­‐up	  fee	  plus	  on	  average	  €11.65	  in	  90-­‐120	  minutes.	   In	  the	  experiment,	  payoffs	  are	   in	   ‘francs’.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	  subject	  pool	  consists	  of	  around	  2000	  individuals	  who	  have	  voluntarily	  registered.	  Almost	  all	  of	  these	  are	  undergraduate	  students	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Amsterdam,	  of	  which	  approximately	  40%	  major	  in	  Economics	  or	  Business.	  When	  the	  experiment	  was	  announced,	  all	  received	  an	  invitation	  to	  sign	  up	  and	  participation	  was	  on	  a	  first-­‐come,	  first-­‐serve	  basis.	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cumulative	  earnings	  in	  francs	  are	  exchanged	  for	  euros	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  1	  euro	  per	  10	  francs.	  	  We	  ran	  six	  sessions.	  Each	  session	  consists	  of	  24	  periods.	  In	  each	  period	  subjects	  are	   rematched	   in	   groups	   of	   three.	  We	   use	  matching	   groups	   of	   6	   or	   9	   subjects.29	  After	  groups	  have	  been	  formed,	  subjects	  are	  randomly	  appointed	  the	  role	  of	  player	  ‘A’,	  ‘B’,	  or	  ‘C’.	  To	  avoid	  focality,	  players	  do	  not	  play	  the	  normalized	  game	  described	  above	  (e.g.	  B’s	  position	  is	  not	  set	  equal	  to	  0	  and	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  that	  A’s	  ideal	  value	  is	  closer	  to	  B’s	  value	  than	  C’s	  is).	  For	  analysis,	  the	  bargaining	  prob-­‐lem	  subjects	  face	  can	  easily	  be	  normalized	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  model	  of	  section	  2.	  	  Each	  player	  is	  appointed	  an	  ‘ideal	  value’,	  which	  is	  an	  integer	  between	  0	  and	  100	  (inclusive).30	  Player	  A’s	  ideal	  value	  is	  always	  the	  smallest	  and	  player	  C’s	  the	  largest.	  Players	  know	  all	  ideal	  values.	  Each	  group	  has	  to	  choose	  an	  integer	  between	  0	  and	  100	  (inclusive).	  If	  the	  group	  chooses	  a	  player’s	  ideal	  value,	  this	  player	  receives	  20	  francs.	  For	  every	  unit	  further	  from	  her	  ideal	  point,	  one	  franc	  is	  subtracted	  from	  her	  earnings.	  Hence,	  earnings	  are	  negative	  for	  a	  player	  if	  the	  group	  chooses	  a	  number	  that	  is	  more	  than	  20	  larger	  or	  smaller	  than	  her	  ideal	  value.	  To	  avoid	  negative	  total	  earnings	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  each	  subject	  starts	  with	  a	  positive	  balance	  of	  100	  francs.31	  	  The	   procedure	  was	   varied	   in	   a	   between	   subjects	   design,	  which	   consisted	   of	   a	  
formal	  and	  an	   informal	  treatment.	  We	  ran	  three	  sessions	  per	  treatment,	  and	  have	  six	  matching	  groups	  in	  each.	  In	  both	  treatments	  proposals	  are	  made,	  consisting	  of	  any	  integer	  between	  0	  and	  100	  (inclusive)	  or	  δ	  (called	  “end”).	  If	  the	  disagreement	  point	  is	  the	  outcome,	  each	  player	  receives	  a	  payoff	  of	  zero.	  32	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Subjects	  are	  told	  that	  they	  are	  in	  a	  session	  with	  15	  or	  18	  participants	  and	  will	  be	  rematched	  in	  every	  round.	  30	  The	  restriction	  to	  natural	  numbers	  is	  done	  for	  practical	  purposes.	  It	  is	  sufficiently	  fine-­‐mazed	  to	  avoid	  affecting	  the	  equilibria	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  in	  any	  relevant	  way.	  One	  differ-­‐ence	   is	   that	   if	   the	  outcome	  converges	   in	  T	  to	  0,	   it	  converges	   in	   finite	   time	  and,	   for	  our	  parameter	  values,	   in	   fact	   it	   already	   converges	   for	   T	   <	   10.	   In	   Table	   3,	   we	   report	   the	   equilibria	   of	   the	   high	  structure	  game	  with	  a	  discretized	  line	  and	  10	  rounds	  (which	  we	  calculated	  numerically).	  31	  Still,	  five	  subjects	  ended	  their	  session	  with	  negative	  earnings.	  They	  were	  sent	  off	  with	  no	  pay	  other	  than	  the	  €5	  show-­‐up	  fee.	  Data	  which	  involved	  these	  individuals	  were	  deleted	  from	  the	  sample	  due	  to	  possible	  incentive	  problems.	  Including	  these	  individuals	  makes	  little	  difference,	  except	  that	  statistical	   results	   become	   somewhat	   less	   conclusive	   due	   to	   one	   subject’s	   extreme	   behavior,	   He	  would	  have	  lost	  14.70	  euros	  and	  showed	  erratic	  behavior	  after	  his	  earnings	  had	  become	  negative.	  32	  In	   both	   treatments,	   a	   round	  of	   bilateral	  messages	   precedes	   group	  negotiations:	   each	  player	  may	   send	   a	   private	  message	   (consisting	   of	   a	   number	   between	  0	   and	   100	   or	  δ)	   to	   either	   or	   both	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In	  the	  formal	  treatment,	  subjects	  play	  the	  game	  Γ!! 	  of	  section	  3.1	  with	  T	  =	  10;	  i.e.,	  negotiations	   where	   held	   for	   a	   maximum	   of	   10	   rounds	   per	   period.	   We	   use	   the	  strategy	  method	   (for	   proposals)	   where	   in	   every	   round	   every	   player	   is	   asked	   to	  make	   a	   proposal.	   One	   proposal	   is	   randomly	   selected	   and	   put	   to	   the	   other	   two	  group	  members	   to	  vote	  on.	   If	  at	   least	  one	  of	   the	   two	  accepts	   this	  proposal,	   it	  be-­‐comes	   the	   group	   choice	   and	   the	   game	   ends.	   If	   the	   proposal	   is	   rejected	   by	   both	  players,	  a	  new	  round	  begins,	  unless	  10	  rounds	  have	  been	  finished.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  outcome	  is	  the	  disagreement	  point.	  In	  the	  informal	  treatment,	  subjects	  are	  given	  two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  minutes	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement.	  At	  any	  time,	  any	  group	  member	  can	  make	  a	  proposal,	  change	  a	  previ-­‐ous	  own	  proposal	  or	  accept	  one	  made	  by	  another	  member.	  They	  do	  so	  by	  typing	  a	  number	   (proposal)	   and	   clicking	   on	   an	   ok-­‐button,	   respectively	   selecting	   another	  member’s	  proposal	  and	  clicking	  on	  an	  accept-­‐button33.	  As	  soon	  as	  a	  proposal	  has	  been	  accepted,	  this	  becomes	  the	  group	  choice	  for	  the	  period	  and	  negotiations	  are	  finished.	  If	  no	  proposal	  is	  accepted	  within	  the	  time-­‐span,	  the	  disagreement	  point	  is	  the	  outcome.	  This	   treatment	  closely	   follows	  our	   informal	  model.34	  To	  help	  a	  sub-­‐ject	   in	  determining	  her	   choices	  during	   the	  negotiations	   for	   a	   group	  decision,	  her	  screen	  always	  shows	  a	  history	  of	  previous	  rounds,35	  current	  earnings,	  a	  scrollable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  other	  player(s).	  This	  is	  meant	  to	  reflect	  pre-­‐negotiation	  lobbying.	  Importantly,	  because	  this	  game	  is	  with	   perfect	   information,	   this	   cheap-­‐talk	   does	   not	   affect	   the	   theoretical	   analysis	   presented	   in	  section	  3.	  Also	  experimentally,	  the	  messages	  do	  not	  influence	  the	  outcome:	  indeed,	  simple	  regres-­‐sions	  of	  outcomes	  on	  messages	  show	  no	  significant	  effects,	  neither	  on	  the	  real-­‐number	  agreements	  nor	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  disagree.	  More	  information	  is	  available	  upon	  request.	  Note	  that	  this	  limited	  message	  space	  differs	  strongly	  from	  the	  unrestricted	  chat	  in	  Agranov	  and	  Tergiman	  (2014).	  There,	  these	   chats	   increased	   the	   amount	   of	   resources	   obtained	   by	   the	   proposer	   in	   a	   Baron-­‐Ferejohn	  setting.	  33	  Note	  that	  multiple	  proposals	  may	  be	  on	  the	  table	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  A	  similar	  procedure	  was	  used	  in	  a	  different	  setting	  by	  Montero,	  Sefton	  and	  Zhang	  (2008).	  	  34	  We	  do	  not	  impose	  a	  reaction	  or	  waiting	  time.	  In	  the	  model,	  these	  times	  do	  not	  represent	  pro-­‐cedural	   restrictions	   but	   rather	   cognitive	   and	   physical	   restrictions,	  which	   are	   allowed	   to	   be	   arbi-­‐trarily	  small.	  We	  also	  do	  not	  require	  that	  players	  retract	  their	  own	  proposal	  before	  they	  can	  accept	  another.	   In	   the	   model,	   we	   need	   this	   requirement	   to	   guarantee	   a	   well-­‐defined	   outcome.	   In	   the	  experiment,	  we	  do	  not	  require	  this,	  as	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  player	  accepts	  a	  proposal	  at	  the	  exact	  same	  time	  her	  own	  proposal	  is	  accepted	  is	  zero.	  Implementing	  the	  additional	  restriction	  would	  not	  make	  a	  big	  behavioral	  difference	   (it	  would	   take	   two	  mouse	  clicks	   instead	  of	  one	   to	  accept	  a	  pro-­‐posal),	   but	   would	  make	   the	   interface	   unnecessarily	  more	   cumbersome.	   Otherwise,	   the	   rules	   are	  identical	  to	  those	  in	  Γ!! 	  	  35	  The	  history	  showed	  for	  each	  previous	  round	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  group	  the	  player	  partici-­‐pated	  in.	  In	  particular,	  it	  specified	  (i)	  the	  ideal	  point	  for	  each	  role,(ii)	  the	  role	  the	  player	  herself	  had,	  (iii)	  the	  outcome	  and	  (iv)	  the	  earnings	  for	  all	  three	  roles.	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help-­‐box	  with	  instructions,	  a	  history	  of	  offers	  in	  the	  current	  round	  and	  a	  device	  to	  calculate	  payoffs	  for	  any	  hypothetical	  proposal.	  Polarization	  is	  varied	  in	  a	  within-­‐subjects	  design	  by	  using	  12	  sets	  of	  ideal	  values.	  Each	  set	  was	  used	  once	   in	   the	   first	  half	   (first	  12	  periods)	  and	  once	   in	   the	  second	  
half	  (last	  12	  periods)	  of	  a	  session.	  The	  sets	  were	  chosen	  such	  that	  for	  the	  normal-­‐ized	  parameters	  there	  were	  six	  with	  a<1	  and	  six	  with	  1<a<2	  (cf.	  Table	  3,	  below).	  We	   chose	   not	   to	   use	   parameters	   with	   a≥2	   in	   the	   experiment	   because	   it	   seems	  obvious	  that	  participants	  will	  always	  agree	  on	  the	  disagreement	  point	  of	  no	  earn-­‐ings	  if	  there	  is	  no	  outcome	  where	  at	  least	  two	  players	  have	  positive	  earnings.	  	  Table	  3	  gives	  the	  (normalized)	  parameters	  used,	  the	  periods	  in	  which	  they	  were	  used	   and	   the	   theoretical	   predictions	   for	   each	   set.	  We	   can	   conclude	   a	   few	   things	  from	  this	  table	  about	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  cooperative	  solutions	  and	  the	  equilib-­‐rium	   of	   the	   formal	   game.	   First,	   as	   long	   as	  a<1	   (weak	   polarization)	   the	  median’s	  payoff	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  level	  of	  polarization.	  Second,	  when	  a>1	  the	  median’s	  payoff	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   decrease	   with	   polarization.	   Third,	   when	   the	   core	   is	  empty,	  there	  are	  many	  instances	  where	  the	  SPE-­‐outcomes	  of	  the	  formal	  game	  are	  not	  in	  the	  uncovered	  set.	  	  
5. Experimental	  Results	  
Online	  Appendix	  E	  compares	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  various	  solution	  concepts.	  Here,	  we	  focus	  on	  how	  formality	  (and	  its	  interaction	  with	  polarization)	  affects	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  median	  player	  to	  reach	  agreements	  close	  to	  her	  ideal	  point.	  All	  tests	  used	  below	  are	  two-­‐sided	  and	  non-­‐parametric,	  using	  each	  matching	  group	  (of	  six	  or	  nine	  participants)	  as	  one	  independent	  data	  point.	  We	  use	  the	  Wilcoxon	  signed	  rank	  tests	  for	  within	  comparisons	  and	  the	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  test	  for	  between	  compar-­‐isons.	   Whenever	   we	   report	   statistically	   significant	   results	   for	   pooled	   For-­‐
mal/Informal	  data	   only,	   the	   results	   are	   also	   significant	   at	   the	   0.05	   level	   for	   the	  disaggregated	  data	  where	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  are	  tested	  separately.	  p-­‐values	  that	  are	  (unrounded)	  smaller	  than	  0.05	  are	  marked	  by	  an	  asterisk.	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TABLE	   3	  PARAMETERS	  AND	  PREDICTIONS	  Parame-­‐ters	   Periods	   Cooperative1	   Formal	  game2	   Informal	  game	  
a	   b	   	   	   1	  starts	   2	  starts	   3	  starts	   	  0.2	   1.4	   5,	  23	   0	   0	   0	   0	   [-­‐0.2,	  1.4]  ∪{δ}	  0.5	   1.1	   3,	  21	   0	   0	   0	   0	   [-­‐0.5,	  1.1]  ∪{δ}	  0.5	   1.7	   11,	  13	   0	   0	   0	   0	   [-­‐0.5,	  1.7]  ∪{δ}	  0.8	   0.8	   1,	  19	   0	   0	   0	   0	   [-­‐0.8,	  0.8]  ∪{δ}	  0.8	   1.4	   9,	  15	   0	   0	   0	   0	   [-­‐0.8,	  1.4]  ∪{δ}	  0.8	   2	   8,	  24	   0	   0	   0	   0	   [-­‐0.8,	  2.0]  ∪{δ}	  1.1	   1.1	   7,	  17	   {−0.1,	  0,	  0.1,δ}	   −0.3	   0	   0.3	   [-­‐1.1,	  1.1]  ∪{δ}	  1.1	   1.7	   10,	  22	   {−0.1,	  0,	  δ}	   −0.4	   −0.15	   0.4	   [-­‐1.1,	  1.7]  ∪{δ}	  1.1	   2.3	   2,	  14	   {−0.1,	  0,	  δ}	   −0.45	   −0.15	   0.45	   [-­‐1.1,	  2.3]  ∪{δ}	  1.4	   1.4	   12,	  20	   {−0.4,	  0,	  0.4,δ}	   δ	   0	   δ	   [-­‐1.4,	  1.4]  ∪{δ}	  1.4	   2	   4,	  16	   {−0.4,	  0,	  δ}	   −0.55	   0.2	   δ	   [-­‐1.4,	  2.0]  ∪{δ}	  1.7	   1.7	   6,	  18	   {−0.7,	  0,	  0.7,δ}	   δ	   {-­‐0.5,0.5}	   δ	   [-­‐1.7,	  1.7]  ∪{δ}	  
Notes:	   Cells	   give	   the	   theoretical	   prediction	   (cf.	   Table	   1)	   applied	   to	   the	   experimental	   parameter	  set.	  The	  predictions	  for	  the	  formal	  procedure	  are	  for	  the	  game	  with	  a	  discretized	  outcome	  set	  and	  10	  rounds,	  as	  played	  in	  the	  experiment.	  1For	  a<1	  the	  prediction	  is	  given	  by	  the	  core	  (=uncovered	  set);	  for	  a>1	  it	  is	  given	  by	  the	  uncovered	  set.	  2The	   column	   gives	   the	   (refined)	   SPE	   conditional	   on	   the	   player	   chosen	   to	  make	   the	   first	   offer.	  Player	  2	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  median	  position,	  1	  is	  the	  other	  player	  closest	  to	  the	  median.	  
5.1 Earnings	  
We	  start	  with	  players’	   earnings	   from	  negotiations.	  Figure	  2	   shows	   the	  payoffs	  for	  different	   levels	   of	   polarization	   (captured	  by	  a)	   and	   the	   two	   treatments.	  Most	  relevant	  are	  the	  payoffs	  of	  the	  median	  player.	  First	  consider	  the	  effect	  of	  polariza-­‐tion.	  Theory	  predicts	  that	  for	  weak	  polarization	  (a	  <	  1)	  the	  median	  player	  will	  be	  able	   to	   secure	   her	  maximum	   payoff	   (of	   1),	   whereas	  moderate	   levels	   (1<a<2)	   of	  polarization	  would	  hurt	  her	  (cf.	  Table	  3).	  The	  experimental	  results	  show	  no	  obvious	  change	  at	  a	  =	  1.	  Increasing	  polariza-­‐tion	  clearly	  affects	   the	  median	  player	  (player	  2)	  negatively,	  even	  when	  a	  <	  1.	  For	  example,	   Player	   2	   earns	   approximately	   0.9	   (close	   to	   the	   maximum	   of	   1)	   when	  
a=0.2	   (for	   both	   Formal	   and	   Informal)	   but	   only	   just	   over	   0.79	   for	   a=0.8	   in	   the	  informal	  setting.	  Her	  earnings	  are	  significantly	  lower	  for	  a=0.8	  than	  for	  a=0.2	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  Figure	  2	  	  	  	  	  This	  figure	  shows	  payoffs.	  The	  bars	  show	  the	  average	  payoffs	  of	  players	  per	  period.	  Player	  2	  is	  the	  median	  player	  and	  player	  1	  is	  the	  other	  player	  closest	  to	  her.	  	  (p=0.01*).	   As	   predicted	   by	   theory,	   the	  median’s	   payoff	   is	   significantly	   lower	   for	  moderate	  (a>1)	  than	  for	  weak	  (a<1)	  polarization	  (p<0.01*).	  Second,	   formality	   also	   has	   a	   clear	   effect.	   The	   median	   player	   is	   (significantly)	  better	  off	   in	   the	   Informal	   treatment	   than	   in	   the	  Formal	   treatment	   (p=0.03*).	  The	  difference	  between	   treatments	   seems	   to	   increase	  with	   the	  extent	  of	  polarization.	  When	  polarization	   is	   very	  weak	   (a=0.2)	   the	  procedure	  does	  not	   affect	  player	  2’s	  earnings	  from	  negotiations.	  When	  it	   is	  relatively	  strong	  (a=1.7)	  the	  median	  earns	  more	  than	  twice	  as	  much	  in	  Informal	  than	  in	  Formal.	  Next,	  we	  further	  explore	  what	  drives	  these	  results.	  	  
5.2. How	  Polarization	  &	  Formality	  Affect	  The	  Median	  Player	  	  
We	  start	  by	  looking	  at	  whether	  participants	  manage	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  be-­‐fore	  the	  deadline.	  Figure	  3	  shows	  the	  number	  of	  proposals	  needed	  to	  reach	  agree-­‐ment.	  In	  both	  treatments,	  agreement	  was	  reached	  within	  the	  limit	  (150	  seconds	  or	  10	  rounds,	  respectively)	  in	  99%	  of	  all	  cases.	  Hence,	  it	  almost	  never	  occurred	  that	  the	  disagreement	  point	  was	  forced	  upon	  the	  negotiators	  for	  missing	  their	  limit.	  	  
	  24	  	  
	  
	  Figure	  3	  This	  figure	  shows	  the	  rounds	  or	  proposals	  before	  agreement.	  Bars	  show	  the	  fraction	  of	  agreements	  using	  the	  number	  of	  proposals	  depicted	  on	  the	  horizontal	  axis	  for	  Formal	  (top	  panel)	  and	  Informal	  (bottom	  panel).	  In	  Formal,	  a	  proposal	  in	  any	  round	  could	  only	  be	  made	  by	  the	  player	  selected	  to	  do	  so	  and	  there	  was	  a	  maximum	  of	  10	  rounds.	   In	  Informal,	  any	  player	  could	  make	  a	  proposal	  at	  any	  time	  during	  a	  period	  of	  at	  most	  150	  seconds.	  	   Moreover,	  agreement	  was	  generally	  reached	  very	  quickly.	  In	  Formal,	  agreement	  was	  reached	   in	  at	  most	  3	   rounds	   in	  88%	  of	   the	  cases	  and	   in	   Informal	  agreement	  was	   reached	   in	   at	   most	   30	   seconds	   in	   82%	   of	   the	   cases.	   Consequently,	   binding	  (time)	   limits	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  of	  any	   influence	  (for	  treatment	  effects).	  Players	  make	   significantly	  more	   proposals	   in	   Informal	   (4)	   than	   in	   Formal	   (2)	   (p<0.01*),	  however.	  The	   outcome	   of	   the	   game	   can	   be	   characterized	   by	   three	   dimensions.	   First,	  whether	   it	   is	  a	  real	  number	   (as	  opposed	  to	  disagreement).	   If	   so,	  second,	   its	  value	  (‘location’)	   and,	   third,	   its	   distance	   to	   the	  median	   position,	   i.e.,	   its	   absolute	   value	  (‘distance’).	  We	  will	  look	  at	  each	  of	  these	  in	  turn.	  Figure	  3	  shows	  the	  percentages	  of	  outcomes	   that	  were	   a	   real	   number	   (‘frequency’).	  As	   long	   as	  polarization	   is	  weak	  (a<1),	  virtually	  all	  outcomes	  are	  real	  numbers	  and	  polarization	  is	  immaterial.	  
Formal 
Informal 
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  Figure	  3	  	  	  	  	  This	  figure	  shows	  the	  frequency	  (of	  outcomes	  were	  a	  real	  number).	  The	  bars	  show	  the	  percent-­‐age	  of	  outcomes	  that	  were	  a	  real	  number.	  
	   The	  frequency	  (of	  real	  number	  agreements)	  is,	  however,	  clearly	  and	  statistically	  significantly	   lower	   for	   moderate	   than	   for	   weak	   polarization	   (p<0.01*).	   Hence,	   a	  decrease	   in	   real	  number	  agreements	  may	  partly	   explain	  why	  moderate	  polariza-­‐tion	   is	   worse	   for	   the	  median	   player	   than	  weak	   polarization.	   However,	   it	   cannot	  explain	  why	  she	  cannot	  obtain	  her	  optimal	  payoff	  even	  when	  polarization	  is	  weak.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  treatment	  effect.	  Real	  number	  outcomes	  are	  some-­‐what	  less	  likely	  in	  Formal,	  but	  the	  effect	  is	  small	  and	  insignificant	  (p=0.33	  for	  a<1	  and	   p=0.22	   for	   a>1).	   Hence,	   the	   percentage	   of	   real	   number	   outcomes	   cannot	  explain	  why	  the	  median	  player	  is	  better	  off	  in	  Informal.	  To	  consider	  the	  combined	  effects	  of	  formality	  and	  polarization	  on	  the	  outcome,	  we	  provide	  the	  results	  of	  a	  logit	  regression.	  We	  regress	  a	  binary	  variable	  indicating	  whether	   or	   not	   disagreement	   was	   chosen	   on	   polarization,	   a	   treatment	   dummy,	  their	   interaction	   (to	   allow	  polarization	   to	   have	   a	   distinct	   effect	   in	   the	   two	   treat-­‐ments)	  and	   two	  controls	   for	  period.	  The	  results	  are	  presented	   in	   the	  second	  col-­‐umn	  of	  Table	  4.	  The	  results	  confirm	  those	  derived	  from	  Figure	  4.	  Polarization	  has	  a	  strong	   and	   significant	   positive	   effect	   on	   the	   chances	   of	   agreeing	   to	   disagree	   but	  formality	  does	  not.	  Moreover,	  the	  interaction	  term	  shows	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  polari-­‐zation	  does	  not	  significantly	  depend	  on	  the	  treatment.	  Finally,	  note	  that	  there	  does	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TABLE	  4	  REGRESSIONS	  	   Dependent	  Variable	  Independent	  Variable	   Disagreement	   Distance	  Constant	   –8.97***	   0.11**	  Period	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –0.02	   	  	  	  	  	  	  –0.01**	  Period2/100	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.00	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.00	  Formal	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.74	   	  	  	  	  	  	  –0.02	  Polarization	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.85***	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.24***	  Polarization*Formal	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –0.21	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.14**	  
Notes:	  Cells	  give	  the	  regression	  coefficients.	  Column	  2	  uses	  a	  logit	  regression	  where	   the	   dependent	   variable	   is	   a	   dummy	   with	   value	   1	   if	   the	   outcome	   is	   an	  agreement	  to	  disagree	  and	  0	  if	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  real	  number.	  The	  very	  few	  (<1%)	  cases	  where	   disagreement	  was	   forced	   upon	   the	   players	   are	   treated	   as	  missing	  values.	   Column	  3	   uses	   a	   linear	   regression	  where	   the	   dependent	   variable	   is	   the	  absolute	  distance	  between	  the	  real	  number	  agreed	  upon	  and	  the	  median	  position	  of	  0.	  Cases	  where	  no	  real	  number	  was	  agreed	  upon	  are	  treated	  as	  missing	  values.	  
Period(2)	   denotes	   the	   (squared)	   period	   number.	   Formal	   is	   a	   dummy	   variable	  equal	  to	  1	  (0)	  in	  the	  	  (In)Formal	  treatment.	  Polarization	  is	  the	  value	  of	  variable	  a.	  In	   both	   cases,	   robust	   standard	   errors	   are	   clustered	   at	   the	   level	   of	   matching	  groups.	  ***/**	  indicates	  significance	  at	  the	  1%-­‐/5%-­‐level.	  	  not	   seem	   to	   be	   much	   learning	   going	   on;	   there	   are	   no	   significant	   effects	   of	   the	  period	  variables.	  	  	  In	  search	  of	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  the	  median	  is	  better	  off	  in	  Informal,	  we	  take	  a	  closer	   look	  at	   the	   real	  number	  outcomes	  players	   agreed	  upon.	   For	   completeness	  sake,	  we	  first	  depict	  the	  location	  of	  real	  number	  agreements	  in	  Figure	  4	  (although	  the	   location	  per	  se	   is	  not	   relevant	   for	  player	  2’s	  payoff).	   In	   this	   figure,	  a	  negative	  number	  indicates	  that	  an	  agreement	  has	  been	  reached	  on	  an	  outcome	  between	  the	  ideal	   points	   of	   players	   1	   and	   2	   (almost	   always,	   this	   is	   an	   agreement	   between	  players	  1	  and	  2)	  while	  a	  positive	  number	  indicates	  agreement	  on	  a	  point	  between	  the	   ideal	   points	   of	   players	   2	   and	   3	   (almost	   always	   agreed	   upon	   by	   these	   two	  players).	  The	  results	  show	  that	   in	  almost	  all	  cases	  where	   	  a	  <	  b,	   the	  average	  out-­‐come	   is	   negative.	   In	   fact,	   there	   are	   only	   two	   cases	   with	   a≠b	   where	   the	   average	  agreement	  lies	  between	  the	  ideal	  points	  of	  the	  median	  player	  and	  player	  3.	  In	  both	  cases,	  player	  1	  still	  earns	  more	  that	  player	  3.	  This	  is	  clear	  evidence	  that	  the	  average	  agreement	  is	  typically	  between	  the	  ideal	  points	  of	  the	  median	  player	  and	  the	  other	  player	  closest	  to	  the	  median.	  We	  will	  discuss	  the	  coalitions	  observed	  in	  more	  detail	  further	  on.	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  Figure	  4	  	  	  	  	  This	   figure	   shows	   the	   location	   of	   real	   number	   outcomes.	   Bars	   show	   the	   average	   normalized	  location	   of	   agreements,	   when	   groups	   agreed	   on	   a	   real	   number.	   Negative	   (positive)	   numbers	  indicate	  an	  agreement	  in	  between	  the	  ideal	  points	  of	  players	  1	  (3)	  and	  2.	  The	  median	  position	  is	  an	  agreement	  at	  0.	  Whenever	  a=b,	  the	  non-­‐median	  players	  are	  randomly	  located	  as	  players	  1	  and	  2,	  so	  any	  agreement	  is	  equally	  likely	  to	  be	  normalized	  to	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  number.	  	  	  
	  Figure	  5	  	  	  	  	  This	   figure	   shows	   the	   distance	   of	   real	   number	   outcomes.	   Bars	   show	   the	   average	   absolute	  distance	  between	  agreements	  and	  the	  median	  point,	  when	  groups	  agree	  on	  a	  real	  number.	  	  Given	  that	  an	  outcome	  is	  a	  real	  number,	  the	  median	  player’s	  payoff	   is	  fully	  de-­‐termined	  by	   its	  distance	   to	   the	  median	   ideal	   (0).	  This	   is	   shown	   in	  Figure	  5.	  This	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figure	   clearly	   shows	   that	   the	   distance	   increases	   with	   polarization.	   Distance	   is	  significantly	   higher	   for	  moderate	   than	   for	  weak	   polarization	   (p<0.01*).	   Distance	  matters	  even	  within	  weak	  levels	  of	  polarization:	  it	  is	  significantly	  higher	  for	  a=0.8	  than	  for	  a=0.2	  (p=0.01*	  (pooled),	  p=0.12(Informal),	  p=0.05*	  (Formal)).	  Figure	  5	  also	  shows	  a	  clear	  treatment-­‐effect.	  Distance	  is	  significantly	  lower	  for	  
Informal	   than	   for	   Formal.	   This	   result	   can	   be	   clarified	   further	   by	   the	   regression	  results	  in	  column	  3	  of	  Table	  4.	  Here,	  we	  regress	  the	  distance	  on	  treatment,	  polari-­‐zation,	  their	  interaction	  and	  period.	  The	  results	  confirm	  the	  strong	  positive	  effect	  that	  polarization	  has	  on	  the	  distance.	  As	  polarization	  increases,	  the	  median	  finds	  it	  harder	  to	  achieve	  an	  outcome	  close	  to	  her	   ideal.	  The	  interaction	  term	  shows	  that	  this	  effect	  is	  stronger	  in	  Formal	  than	  in	  Informal.	  In	  fact,	  the	  insignificant	  effect	  of	  the	  treatment	  dummy	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  this	  differential	  effect	  of	  polarization	  that	  is	  causing	  the	  treatment	  differences	  in	  observed	  distance.	  That	  is,	  in	  aggregate,	  the	  median	  obtains	  worse	  outcomes	  in	  Formal	  because	  polarization	  has	  a	  more	  nega-­‐tive	  effect.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  some	  learning	  going	  on.	  Over	  time,	  the	  median	  succeeds	  in	   arriving	   at	   outcomes	   closer	   to	   her	   ideal.	   The	   lack	   of	   a	   significant	   effect	   of	   the	  squared	  period	  variable	  suggests	  that	  this	  learning	  effect	  is	  more	  or	  less	  linear.	  The	  effects	  of	  polarization	  and	  formality	  are	  not	  arrived	  at	  by	  differences	  in	  the	  player	  making	  the	  proposal.	  Table	  5	  shows	  that	  accepted	  proposals	  were	  made	  in	  equal	   proportions	  by	   all	   three	  players.	   It	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   some	  players	  were	  more	   likely	   than	   others	   to	  make	   the	   decisive	   proposal.	   The	   distributions	   do	   not	  differ	   across	   the	   treatments	   (χ2=1.60,	  p=0.45	   for	   all	  decisions;	   χ2=1.3,	  p=0.52	   for	  real	  number	  agreements;	  χ2=3.03,	  p=0.21	  for	  agreements	  to	  disagree).	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  the	  outcome	  (and	  differences	  across	  treatments)	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  to	  specific	  players’	  final	  proposals.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  outcome	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  median	  position	  when	  the	  bargaining	  is	  Informal.	  Player	  2	  somehow	  exploits	  her	  superior	  bargaining	  position	  more	  than	  in	   Formal,	   especially	   as	   polarization	   increases.	   A	   possible	   explanation	   is	   that	  players	  are	  freer	  to	  make	  proposals	  in	  the	  Informal	  negotiations,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  negotiate	  better.	  Contrary	  to	  Formal,	  players	   in	  Informal	  can	  also	  make	  (counter)	  proposals	  when	   there	   already	  proposals	   on	   the	   table.	  Also,	   players	  make	   signifi-­‐cantly	  more	  proposals	  in	  Informal	  (4.0)	  than	  in	  Formal	  (2.0)	  (p<0.01*).	  In	  addition,	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TABLE	  5	  PROPOSERS	  	   	   Accepted	  proposal	   First	  proposal	  	   	   Player	  1	   Player	  2	   Player	  3	   Player	  1	   Player	  2	   Player	  3	  All	  	   Formal	   0.38	   0.30	   0.32	   n.a.	   n.a.	   n.a.	  Informal	   0.37	   0.34	   0.29	   0.41	   0.26	   0.33	  Real	  number	   Formal	   0.37	   0.33	   0.30	   n.a.	   n.a.	   n.a.	  Informal	   0.34	   0.37	   0.28	   0.42	   0.25	   0.33	  Disagreement	   Formal	   0.46	   0.05	   0.49	   n.a.	   n.a.	   n.a.	  Informal	   0.63	   0.00	   0.37	   0.29	   0.38	   0.32	  
Notes.	  In	  columns	  3-­‐5,	  cells	  give	  the	  fraction	  of	  times	  that	  an	  accepted	  proposal	  had	  been	  made	  by	  the	  player	  concerned.	  In	  columns	  6-­‐8,	  cells	  give	  the	  fraction	  of	  times	  that	   the	   first	  proposal	  was	  made	  by	  the	  player	  concerned.	  “n.a.”	  =	  not	  applicable,	  because	  the	  player	  to	  make	  the	  proposal	  was	  randomly	  chosen.	  	  	  we	  find	  that	   in	  Formal	  players	  use	  slightly	  fewer	  proposals	   in	  the	   last	  12	  periods	  (1.9)	  than	  in	  the	  first	  12	  periods	  (2.1).	  In	  contrast,	  in	  Informal,	  players	  use	  signifi-­‐cantly	  more	  proposals	  in	  the	  last	  12	  periods	  (4.5)	  than	  in	  the	  first	  12	  periods	  (3.5)	  (p=0.03*).	   Finally,	   Table	   5	   shows	   that	   the	   better	   negotiation	   results	   by	   median	  players	  in	  Informal	  are	  not	  due	  to	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  early	  proposals.	  	  In	  fact,	  in	   cases	  where	   the	   final	   outcome	   is	   a	   real	   number	   the	  median	   even	   tends	   to	   let	  others	  make	   the	   first	   proposal.	   This	   leaves	   the	   possibility	   to	   respond	   to	   others’	  proposals	  as	  the	  main	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  treatments.	  	  	  We	   conclude	   that	   the	  main	  driving	   force	  underlying	   the	  higher	  profits	   for	   the	  median	   player	   in	   the	   Informal	   treatment	   is	   that	   the	   more	   flexible	   bargaining	  procedure	  allows	  her	  to	  secure	  real	  number	  agreements	  closer	  to	  her	  preference.	  
5.3. Intra-­‐coalitional	  Equality	  vs.	  Inter-­‐coalitional	  Competition	  
One	   intriguing	  question	   that	   remains	   is	  why	  even	  weak	  polarization	  hurts	   the	  median	  player,	  while	  her	  ideal	  is	  the	  unique	  core	  element.	  To	  address	  this	  question,	  we	   consider	   coalitions	   and	   the	  way	   in	  which	   outcomes	  distribute	   payoffs	  within	  them.	   Figure	   6	   shows	   the	   distribution	   of	   real	   number	   agreements	   divided	   by	   a.	  Hence,	  −1	  represents	  an	  agreement	  at	  –a	  (i.e.,	  player	  1’s	  ideal	  point),	  0	  represents	  the	  median	  ideal	  0	  and	  1	  represents	  a.	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  Figure	  6	  	  	  	  	  This	  figure	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  real	  number	  outcomes	  and	  learning	  effects.	  Bars	  show	  the	  fraction	  of	  real	  number	  outcomes	  that	  are	  within	  0.05	  of	   the	  outcome	  depicted	  on	  the	  horizontal	  axis.	   The	   horizontal	   axis	   gives	   the	   normalized	   outcome	   divided	   by	   a.	   The	   left	   panels	   shows	   the	  distribution	  for	  a<1,	  the	  right	  for	  a>1.	  The	  top	  panels	  show	  the	  distribution	  for	  the	  first	  half	  (first	  12	  periods),	  the	  bottom	  for	  the	  last	  half	  (last	  12	  periods).	  	  Strikingly,	   almost	   all	   real	   number	  outcomes	   lie	  between	  –a/2	  and	  a/2,	  with	   –
a/2	  being	  one	  of	   the	  most	   frequently	  chosen	  outcomes.	  Note	   that	  –a/2	  equalizes	  payoffs	  between	  players	  1	  and	  2,	  but	  is	  a	  rather	  unfair	  outcome	  for	  player	  3;	  in	  fact	  worse	   than	   the	   median	   preference.	   From	   a	   fairness	   perspective	   it	   might	   seem	  remarkable	   that	   the	  players	   in	   the	  coalition	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  care	  much	  about	   the	  player	  outside	  of	  the	  coalition.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  findings	  in	  the	  three-­‐person	   ultimatum	   games	   (Güth	   &	   Van	   Damme,	   1998,	   Bolton	   &	   Ockenfels	  1998),	  where	  the	  third	  powerless	  person	  (who	  can	  neither	  propose	  nor	  reject)	  is	  given	  little	  consideration.	  It	  seems	  that	  players	  1	  and	  3	  in	  many	  cases	  demand	  some	  part	  of	  the	  ‘surplus’	  in	  a	  coalition	  with	  player	  2.	  However,	  player	  2	  does	  not	  give	  more	  than	  the	  equal	  split	  to	  player	  1.	  Furthermore,	  player	  3	  does	  not	  obtain	  a	  better	  outcome	  than	  a/2,	  since	  player	  2	  probably	  feels	  that	  she	  can	  certainly	  obtain	  −a/2	  in	  a	  coalition	  with	  player	  1.	   Such	   considerations	   yield	   real	   number	   agreements	   increasing	   in	   a,	   even	   for	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weak	   levels	   of	   polarization,	   as	  we	   observe.	   Note,	   however,	   that	   as	  a	   increases	   it	  becomes	  more	  costly	   to	   the	  median	  player	   to	  give	  her	  coalition	  partner	  an	  equal	  share.	  	  There	  are	  two	  possible	  reasons	  why	  the	  equal	  shares	  are	  observed	  within	  coali-­‐tions.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  median	  player	  may	  simply	  care	  about	  a	  fair	  distribution	  with	   the	   partner	   (though	   it	   remains	   unclear	   why	   she	   does	   not	   care	   about	   the	  disadvantages	  to	  the	  third	  player).	  Alternatively,	  the	  median	  may	  simply	  underes-­‐timate	   the	  power	   she	  has	   in	  negotiations	  within	   a	   coalition,	   because	   she	  has	   the	  easiest	  option	  of	  switching	  to	  the	  other	  player	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  on	  ‘the	  other	  side’.	  Changes	  in	  outcomes	  over	  time	  allow	  us	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  these	  two	  explana-­‐tions.	  	  	  	  Figure	   6	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   a	   strong	   learning	   effect:	   the	   distribution	   of	   out-­‐comes	  in	  the	  first	  half	  (first	  12	  periods)	  is	  very	  different	  from	  that	  in	  the	  last	  half	  (last	  12	  periods).	  In	  the	  first	  half,	  intra-­‐coalitional	  equality	  considerations	  seem	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role,	  certainly	  within	  coalitions	  of	  players	  1	  and	  2.	  Furthermore,	  coalitions	  tend	  to	  consist	  of	  players	  1	  and	  2,	  in	  particular	  in	  Formal	  (see	  Figure	  7).	  	  	  
	  Figure	  7	  	  	  	  	  This	  figure	  shows	  coalitions	  and	  learning	  effects.	  Stacked	  bars	  show	  the	  distribution	  of	  distinct	  coalitions.	  A	  coalition	  ij	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  outcome	  proposed	  by	  i	  and	  accepted	  by	  j	  or	  vice	  versa.	  A	  coalition	  ijk	  is	  an	  outcome	  with	  2	  yes	  votes	  (only	  possible	  in	  formal).	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In	   the	   course	   of	   the	   experiment,	   inter-­‐coalitional	   competition	   becomes	   more	  important.	  In	  the	  second	  half,	  more	  coalitions	  arise	  of	  players	  2	  and	  3	  than	  in	  the	  first	   half	   (p=0.03*	   (pooled),	   p=0.46	   (Informal),	   p=0.05*	   (Formal)),	   resulting	   in	   a	  more	  even	  spread	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  agreements.	  Furthermore,	  for	  a>1	  more	  coalitions	  are	  formed	  in	  the	  second	  half	  than	  in	  the	  first	  half	  between	  players	  1	  and	  3	  (p=0.03*	  (pooled),	  p=0.03*	  (Informal),	  p=0.21	  (Formal)).	  	  	  Seeing	   the	   viable	   ‘outside	   option’	   of	   a	   coalition	  with	   player	   3	  means	   that	   the	  median	   player	   can	   offer	   less	   to	   player	   1.	   Median	   players	   appear	   to	   realize	   this	  remarkably	  well	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Agreements	  tend	  to	  be	  closer	  to	  0	  in	  the	  last	  half	  (see	  Figure	  6).	  In	  particular,	  the	  number	  of	  balanced	  1-­‐2	  com-­‐promises	  drops	   considerably	   (p<0.01*	   (pooled),	  p=0.04*	   (Informal),	  p=0.05	   (For-­‐
mal))	  with	   an	   accompanying	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   outcomes	   at	   the	  median	  ideal	  (p=0.01*	  (pooled),	  p=0.03*	  (Informal),	  p=0.14	  (Formal)).36	  	  This	  development	  over	  time	  suggests	  that	  preferences	  for	  fair	  distributions	  with	  the	  coalition	  partner	  are	  not	  the	  dominant	  force	  underlying	  the	  results	  in	  Figure	  7	  (after	  all,	  why	  would	  such	  preferences	  change	  over	  time?).	  Instead,	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  first	  and	  second	  half	  of	  the	  experiment	  seem	  to	  favor	  the	  alternative	  explanation	   that,	   over	   time,	   the	   median	   player	   is	   learning	   to	   better	   exploit	   her	  central	  position.	  For	  Informal,	  one	  final	  piece	  of	  evidence	  provides	  further	  support	  for	   this	   learning	   effect.	   Here,	   anyone	   can	  make	   the	   first	   offer	   and	   this	   first	   offer	  may	  reflect	  one’s	   intentions.	  We	  compare	  for	  each	  player	  the	  mean	  offer	  made	  in	  the	   first	  half	   to	   the	  mean	  offer	  made	   in	   the	  second	  half	   (in	  both	  cases	  only	  when	  making	  the	  first	  offer).	  For	  player	  1,	  this	   ‘first	  shot’	  was	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  in	  both	  cases	  (moving	  from	  –0.38	  to	  –0.35).	  For	  player	  3,	  the	  move	  was	  larger,	  but	  it	  remained	   far	   from	   the	  median	   position	   (from	   0.55	   to	   0.31).	   The	   largest	   relative	  change	  between	  the	  first	  and	  second	  half	  was	  observed	  for	  the	  median	  players.	  In	  the	   first	   half,	   their	   opening	   offer	   was	   already	   aimed	   towards	   player	   1,	   with	   an	  average	  of	  –0.11.	  In	  the	  second	  half,	  they	  opened	  with	  an	  offer	  very	  close	  to	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  The	   absolute	   distance	   of	   the	   outcome	   to	   the	  median	   position	   decreases	   in	   both	   treatments	  over	  time.	  The	  relative	  decrease	  is	  of	  a	  comparable	  magnitude.	  In	  Informal,	  the	  distance	  decreases	  from	  0.26	  in	  the	  first	  half	  to	  0.17	  in	  the	  second	  (a	  35%	  decrease)	  and	  in	  Formal	  this	  is	  from	  0.38	  to	  0.26	   (32%).	   For	   completeness’	   sake,	   appendix	   F	   provides	   information	   about	   real	   number	   agree-­‐ments,	  location,	  and	  distance,	  separately	  for	  the	  first	  and	  second	  halves	  of	  the	  experiment.	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own	   ideal	  point:	   –0.02.	  This	   suggests	   that	   the	  median	  player	   learns	  over	   time	   to	  make	  more	  aggressive	  proposals.	  	  
6. Conclusion	  
In	  this	  paper,	  we	  have	  addressed	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  legis-­‐lative	   process	   is	   affected	   by	   the	   formality	   of	   the	   bargaining	   procedure.	  We	   com-­‐pared	  an	  informal	  bargaining	  procedure	  where	  players	  can	  freely	  make	  and	  accept	  proposals	   to	   a	   formal	   bargaining	   procedure	   where	   agenda-­‐setting	   and	   voting	   is	  regulated	  by	  a	  Baron-­‐Ferejohn	  alternating	  offers	  scheme.	  We	  studied	  the	  effect	  of	  formality	   in	   a	   legislative	   bargaining	   problem	   that	   consisted	   of	   a	   three-­‐player	  median	   voter	   setting	   modified	   to	   have	   an	   external	   disagreement	   point.	   This	   al-­‐lowed	  us	  to	  study	  formality	  both	  when	  the	  core	  exists	  and	  when	  it	  is	  empty,	  and	  to	  study	  whether	  an	  external	  disagreement	  point	  can	  explain	  why	  the	  polarization	  of	  a	   legislature	  can	  affect	   the	   legislative	  outcome.	  We	  derived	  cooperative	  solutions	  for	   the	  bargaining	  problem,	  studied	   the	  equilibrium	  properties	  of	   the	   formal	  and	  informal	  bargaining	  games,	  and	  tested	  the	  two	  procedures	  in	  the	  laboratory.	  Our	  first	  result	  pertains	  to	  polarization.	  Theoretically,	  we	  find	  that	  polarization	  should	  matter	  when	  there	  is	  an	  external	  disagreement	  point	  and	  in	  our	  experiment,	  we	  find	  that	  this	   is	   indeed	  the	  case.37	  In	  particular,	  polarization	  hurts	  the	  median	  player.	  As	  predicted	  by	  theory,	  in	  our	  experiments	  the	  median	  player	  is	  significant-­‐ly	  worse	   of	   at	  moderate	   than	   at	  weak	   levels	   of	   polarization.	   In	   contrast	   to	  what	  theory	  predicts,	   however,	  more	  polarization	  hurts	   the	  median	  player	   even	  when	  her	  ideal	  is	  the	  unique	  core	  element.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  intra-­‐coalitional	  equality	  considerations.	  Over	  time,	  inter-­‐coalitional	  competition	  appears	  to	  atten-­‐uate	  such	  considerations	  as	  the	  median	  player	  learns	  to	  better	  exploit	  her	  negotia-­‐tion	  power	  and	  she	  is	  hurt	  less	  by	  polarization.	  Our	  second	  and	  main	  result	  is	  that	  formality	  matters.	  Theoretically,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  analyze	  the	  effects	  of	  formality,	  as	  a	  key	  characteristic	  of	  informal	  bargaining	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Recall	   that	   polarization	   does	   not	   matter	   in	   the	   classic	   median	   voter	   setting	   (Black,	   1948;	  1958).	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that	   it	   imposes	  very	   few	  strategic	  restrictions	  on	   the	  negotiators.	  We	   find	   that	   in	  the	   informal	   game,	   all	   plausible	   outcomes	   are	   supported	   as	   subgame	   perfect	  equilibrium	  points.	  This	   is	  an	  important	  motivation	  to	  run	  experiments.	  The	  data	  show	  a	  clear	  treatment	  effect	  of	  formality.	  The	  median	  player	  in	  our	  experiment	  is	  significantly	   better	   off	   under	   an	   informal	   bargaining	   procedure	   without	   rules	  about	   the	   timing	  of	  proposal	  and	  acceptance	  decisions.	  Outcomes	   in	   the	   Informal	  treatment	  are	  significantly	  more	  often	  the	  median	  ideal	  and	  significantly	  less	  often	  a	   compromise	   between	   players	   1	   and	   2.	   It	   appears	   that	   the	   informal	   procedure	  gives	  the	  median	  player	  more	  flexibility	  to	  exploit	  her	  superior	  bargaining	  position.	  This	  result	  supports	  the	  armchair	  observation	  that	  players	   in	  a	  better	  bargaining	  position	  prefer	  less	  regulation	  of	  negotiations.	  	  Our	  results	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  application	  of	  game	  theoretic	  models	  to	  the	  leg-­‐islative	   process.	   The	   fact	   that	   formality	   influences	   the	   payoffs	   of	   certain	   players	  and	   the	   performance	   of	   specific	   predictions	   means	   that	   ‘neutral’	   simplifying	  assumptions	   (i.e.,	   assumptions	   that	  do	  not	   favor	  any	  player	  prima	  facie)	  made	   to	  obtain	  tractable	  results	  need	  not	  be	  as	  innocuous	  as	  is	  often	  assumed.	  For	  instance,	  a	  highly	  stylized	  alternating	  offers	  game	  may	  not	  be	  a	  suitable	  model	  of	  the	  legisla-­‐tive	  process	  if	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  bargaining	  is	  informal.	  Finally,	  understanding	  the	  influence	  of	  formality	  is	  relevant	  for	  studying	  institu-­‐tional	   choice	   and	   parliamentary	   procedure.	   In	   particular,	   legislatures	   have	   to	  decide	  on	  a	  bargaining	  procedure	  –either	  from	  scratch	  or	  from	  a	  set	  of	  previously	  established	  procedures–	  before	  they	  can	  decide	  on	  the	  outcome	  itself.	  Even	  if	  the	  extent	  of	  formality	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  neutral	  parameter,	  it	  can	  significantly	  influence	  the	  bargaining	  outcome.	  Consequently,	  parties	  may	  have	  preferences	  for	  a	  formal	  or	  informal	  bargaining	  procedure.	  For	  instance,	  parties	  in	  the	  center	  of	  a	  political	  spectrum	  may	  prefer	   to	  prolong	  backroom	  discussions	  until	  agreement	  has	  been	  reached.	   Our	   results	   point	   to	   the	   more	   general	   idea	   that	   parties	   in	   a	   superior	  bargaining	   position	   will	   prefer	   less	   formal	   bargaining	   institutions,	   as	   these	   give	  them	  more	  room	  to	  exploit	  their	  bargaining	  position.	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